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ASSESSMENT OF INCREMENTAL PRICING
UNDER THE NATURAL GAS POLICY
ACT
William A. Mogel*
and William R. Mapes, Jr.**

I.

INTRODUCTION

[We] greatly resent the idea that [we] are the primitive predecessors of other creatures.'
Title II of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) 2 mandates that
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)3 establish by
rulemaking proceedings4 a new rate design methodology for the sales price
of natural gas sold by interstate pipeline companies subject to its jurisdiction.' That new rate design is called "incremental pricing" by the NGPA.6
B.A., Hobart College, 1963; L.L.B. University fPennsylvania,1966. Mr. Mogel is a
partner of Ross, Marsh & Foster, Washington, D. C.
** B.S, Miami University,1974; J.D., American University, 1977 Mr. Mapes is an associate ofRoss, Marsh & Foster, Washington, D. C
1. Will, FootprintsAge, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1979, § A, at 19, col. 1.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3341-48 (Supp. 11 1978).
*

3. The FERC, a five-member independent regulatory agency within the Department
of Energy, succeeded to the functions of the Federal Power Commission (FPC). See Dep't
of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 1 1977); Exec. Order No. 12,009,
3 C.F.R. § 142 (1978). See generally Moody, The FERC Inheritance- UnresolvedProblems
in ProducerRegulation, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND

TAX. 417 (1978); Williams, Natural Gas and the FederalEnergy Regulatory Commision, 13
TULSA L.J. 761 (1978).

4. 15 U.S.C. § 3342 (Supp. H 1978). See generally Mogel, The FederalPowerCommission'sAuthority to Set Area Rates by Rulemaking, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 31, 43-61 (1973);
Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating andRulemakingfor Formulatingand Implementing
Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47-66 (1979).
5. The FERC's jurisdiction is set forth in § 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15
U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976), which provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for
ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other
use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall
not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production
or gathering of natural gas.
See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
6. The incremental pricing provisions of the NGPA are set forth in Title II, 15 U.S.C.
3341-3348 (Supp. I 1978).
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The legislative objective of this form of incremental pricing is the subsidizing of a class of natural gas consumers determined to be "high priority,"' 7 from the price increases permitted by Title I of the NGPA, 8 at the
expense of another class of consumers composed primarily of boiler fuel
users and industrial facilities. 9 Thus, rather than adhering to established
principles of public utility ratemaking, which have as their hallmark the
axiom that rates must be cost-based, 1° Title II of the NGPA sets the price
to be paid by the subsidizing consumers at the ever increasing prices
charged for another commodity, fuel oil. Consequently, the subsidized,
high priority consumers pay for their natural gas service at rates reflecting
less than true cost.
NGPA incremental pricing is bad politics, unsound economics, and an
undesirable rate design. The ultimate effect of the statute and the FERC's
rulemakings will be to increase the costs of natural gas service to the defined high priority market. Such a result is not only contrary to Congress'
intended goal, but also conflicts with the three overriding national objectives of reducing both inflation" and our dependence on foreign oil,' 2 and
7. Section 401(0(2) of the NGPA defines high priority user as:
any person who (A) uses natural gas in a residence;
(B) uses natural gas in a commercial establishment in amounts of less than 50
Mcf on a peak day;
(C) uses natural gas in any school, hospital, or similar institution; or
(D) uses natural gas in any other use the curtailment of which the Secretary of
Energy determines would endanger life, health or maintenance of physical property.
15 U.S.C. § 3391(0(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
8. Id §§ 3301-3333 (Supp. 11 1978). See generally Comment, For Gas, Congress Spells
Relief N-G-P-A." An Analysis of the NaturalGas PolicyAct of 1978, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 429
(1979).
9. Under Title II of the NGPA the term "industrial boiler fuel facility" means any
industrial facility using natural gas as a boiler fuel. 15 U.S.C. § 3341(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
The FERC's regulations further define industrial facility as "any facility engaged primarily
in the extraction or processing of raw materials, or in the processing or changing of raw or
unfinished materials into another form or product." Order No. 49, Regulations Implementing the Incremental Pricing Provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Doc. No.
RM79-14 (Sept. 28, 1978) (to be codified in 18 C.F.R. § 282.103(d)).
The term "boiler fuel use" under Title II of the NGPA means "the use of any fuel for the
generation of steam or electricity." 15 U.S.C. § 3341(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
10. See notes 19-42 and accompanying text infra.
I1. President Carter's Address to the Nation, April 18, 1977, reprinted in SENATE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., THE PRESIDENT'S
ENERGY PROGRAM: A COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS 1-5 (Comm. Print 1977).

12. Id
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conserving our nonrenewable energy resources. 13 These undesirable consequences can be anticipated because the so-called incremental prices to be
paid for natural gas service by the subsidizing industrial and large boiler
fuel users will dramatically increase with ever escalating prices of oil.' 4
These users, therefore, will seek alternate sources of energy and switch
from natural gas. Once this occurs, the fixed and increasing purchased gas
costs of the interstate pipeline companies will be borne by the remaining
consumers, the high priority consumers.
In order to avoid these adverse results, Title II of the NGPA should be
repealed' 5 and the setting of natural gas rates should continue to be costbased. There are other legislative tools available to Congress to shelter
high priority consumers from the price increases of Title I of the NGPA.
Drastic disruptions to the interstate pipelines' consumers and to national
productivity are high prices to pay for a maverick rate design methodology.
This article will discuss, in a background section, general principles of
public utility ratemaking, incremental pricing before the enactment of the
NGPA, and a brief overview of the NGPA. The following section describes Title II of the NGPA. The next section is a critique of Title II
incremental pricing.
II. BACKGROUND

"[Olur only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the
present." 16
13. Professor Commoner has stated that "[n]early all the energy now used comes from
nonrenewable sources. As a nonrenewable source is depleted, it becomes progressively more
costly to exploit, so continued reliance on it means an unending and exponential rise in
price." Commoner, Reflections, The Solar Transition - II, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 30,
1979, at 46.
14. The price of OPEC oil has increased from $1.80 per barrel on January 1, 1970 to
$12.09 per barrel on January 1, 1977 and to $30.00 per barrel on January 1, 1980. Wash.
Post, Dec. 19, 1979, § A, at 22, col. 4. One observer has commented:
As recently as 1972, oil imports cost us less than $5 billion. Seven Years later 1979 - our tab for imported oil is $65 billion. We are transferring that much
wealth annually to the oil-exporting nations. How much is $65 billion? It is, for
one thing, $295 for every one of us, or $1,180 for a family of four.
Tobias, The Only Article on Inflation You Need to Read, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1979, at 49, 50.
15. Legislation (H.R. 5862) has been introduced in the House of Representatives to
repeal Title II. Rep. Richardson Preyer, the cosponsor of H.R. 5862, has commented:
Obviously, these increased operating costs for industry will not simply disappear.
They will be borne, in the form of higher product prices, by all consumers - not
only those who are theoretically protected by incremental pricing. . . . It is contemplated that the passthrough of industrial gas price increases could be 50% or
more with even larger increases ahead as industrial gas prices follow the steep upward curve of fuel oil prices.
INSIDE F.E.R.C. (Dec. 24, 1979), at 12.
16. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897).
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GeneralPrinciples of Public Utility Ratemaking

In enacting the NGPA, Congress intended the statute's pricing provisions to bridge the traditional cost-based ratemaking methodologies and
the eventual price deregulation of natural gas in 1985.17 The NGPA attempts to achieve this by generally replacing the cost-based ratemaking
methods with a multi-tiered system of pricing natural gas.' 8 To evaluate
the wisdom of this congressional ratemaking, it is necessary to review public utility ratemaking principles that had evolved prior to passage of the
NGPA.
It has long been accepted that public utility rates must be based on the
utility's costs.' 9 In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,20 Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:
17. Section 121 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (Supp. 11 1978), provides, subject to
reimposition of price controls pursuant to § 122, 15 U.S.C. § 3332 (Supp. 11 1978), that the
maximum lawful prices for first sales of natural gas established in Title I will cease to apply
effective Janaury 1, 1985, for the following categories of gas:
(1) NEW NATURAL GAS. - New Natural gas (as defined in section 102(c)).
(2) NEW, ONSHORE, PRODUCTION WELLS, - Natural gas produced
from any new, onshore production well (as defined in section 103(c)), if such natural gas -

p (A) was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on April 20,
1977; and
p (B) is produced from a completion location which is located at a depth of
more than 5,000 feet.
(3) INTRASTATE CONTRACTS IN EXCESS OF $1.00. - Natural gas sold
under an existing contract, any successor to an existing contract, or any rollover
contract, if p (A) such natural gas was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce
on November 8, 1978; and
p (B) the price paid for the last deliveries of such natural gas occurring on
December 31, 1984, or, if no deliveries occurred on such date, the price would have
been paid had deliveries occurred on such date, is higher than $1.00 per million
Btu's.
15 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (Supp. 11 1978). See MacAvoy, The NaturalGas PolicyAct of 1978, 19
NAT. RES. L.J. 811, 819-23 (1979).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-3319 (Supp. 11 1978). See generally Cormie, IncrementalPricing
Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 57 DEN. L.J. 1, 3-7 (1979); Nordhaus, Producer
Regulation and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RES. L.J. 829, 848-56 (1979).
19. For comprehensive treatments of public utility economics, see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS (1964); E. NICHOLS, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION (1955); A.
PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1969). See also 1 A. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 20-57 (1970).
20. 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes, not only operating expenses, but also capital
charges.
... [A] rate is constitutionally compensatory, if it allows to
the utility the opportunity to earn the cost of the service as thus
defined.2 1
The second fundamental principle of ratemaking involves the concept of
"rate of return," which is that amount of money a utility is allowed to earn
over and above its operating expenses, depreciation expenses, and taxes.22
This amount is expressed as a percentage of the rate base, that is, the legally determined net valuation of utility property.23 In the landmark case
of Smyth v. Ames, 24 which established this concept of rate base,2 5 the
Court held that in determining the rate of return the Constitution required
that: "[Wihat the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience. ' '26 Unfortunately,
Smyth's description of "fair return" was ambiguous. However, in 1923,
the Supreme Court in Bluefeld Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public
Service Commission of West Virginia,27 held as follows:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties. . . . [T]he return should be
reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and
economical management, to maintain and support its credit and
enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of
its public duties.28
21. Id at 291 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 19, at 149; P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra
note 19, at 116; E. NICHOLS, supra note 19, at 1-2.
23. See, e.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 19, at 159-237.
24. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). See Note, Natural Gas Rate Regulation: The Conflict in the
Application ofthe Just and Reasonable Standard, 12 TULSA L.J. 293, 297 (1976).
25. In Commission proceedings the rate base has generally been defined as the original
cost of the plant which is used or useful in the natural gas business, less accrued depreciation
plus working capital. See A. LEESTON, S. CRICHTON & V. JACOBS, THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 286 (1963). See also F. WELCH, PREPARING FOR THE PUBLIC UTILITY
RATE CASE 179-94 (1954).
26. 169 U.S. at 547.
27. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
28. Id at 692-93.
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Subsequently, in FederalPower Commission v. Hope NaturalGas Co.,
the Supreme Court further elaborated on Bluefleld. The Court emphasized
that the determination of a "fair" rate of return was not dependent on the
particular regulatory method used, so long as the "end result" was reasonable to the consumer and investor.3" The Court reiterated, however, that a
regulatory agency rate order must result in the utility receiving earnings
comparable to those of other enterprises with similar risks. 3 Additionally,
the rate of return must be sufficient to ensure the utility's financial integrity
and its ability to attract new capital.3 2
The Supreme Court, in PhillpsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin ,:3 held that
independent producers which sell natural gas for resale in interstate commerce are "natural gas companies" within the meaning of section 1 of the
Natural Gas Act. 34 Consequently, the FERC's predecessor, the FPC, applied the public utility ratemaking principles discussed above in determinThe FPC
ing a fair rate of return for this natural gas production.
initially determined each individual producer's cost of service and derived
a "fair" rate of return for the sale of natural gas by each producer. 36 However, in 1960 the FPC initiated proceedings3 7 to establish maximum pro-

29. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). InHope, the Court endorsed the FPC's decision to permit only

"actual legitimate costs" to be used in establishing the rate of return. See Hale, Utility
Regulation in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 488 (1944). See
also Bonbright, Contributionsof the FederalPower Commission to the Establishment of the
Prudent Investor Doctrine of Rate-making, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 145-48 (1945).

30. 320 U.S. at 602-03.
31. Id at 603.
32. The Court in Hope stated as follows with respect to the reasonableness of rate of
return:

[lit is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but
also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and
dividends on the stock. . . . By that standard the return to the equity owner
should be commensurate with returns on investments inother enterprises having
corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital.
Id at 603.
33. 347 U.S 672 (1954). See Harrison & Formby, Regional Distortionsin NaturalGas
Allocations." A Legal & Economic Analysis, 57 N.C.L. REV. 57, 63-65 (1978).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 717a (1976). For a critical analysis of the Court's use of the Natural
Gas Act's legislative history in Phillos,see Note, Legislative History ofthe NaturalGas Act,
44 GEO. L.J. 695 (1956).
35. See generally Breyer & MacAvoy, The NaturalGas Shortage and the Regulation of
Natural Gas Producers 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973).

36. The methodology employed was similar to that used to regulate transportation rates
charged by interstate pipeline companies. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
37. See Area Rate Proceedings, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960). See generally Mosburg, The
Study in Group Regulation, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 133 (1966).
Permian Decision -4
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ducer rates for each of the major producing areas, thereby attempting to
avoid setting cost of service prices for each field sale by a producer.3 8
Under this methodology, average industry-wide costs were computed for a
particular region, with a fair rate of return established pursuant to the
principles enunciated in Hope. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's area rate methodology in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,39 which
has been described as probably "the Supreme Court's most important
opinion in the public utility field since Hope Natural Gas."4 In the Permian case, the Court stated that the Hope criteria, "suitably modified to
reflect the special circumstances of area regulation, remain pertinent, but
they scarcely exhaust the relevant considerations."'" Thus, the Court emphasized that "the 'end result' of the Commission's orders must be measured as much by the success with which they protect . . . [the public]
interests as by the effectiveness with which they maintain . . . credit and
• . . attract capital."42
The foregoing body of law evidences an established judicial sanctioning
of cost-based ratemaking methodologies. However, as this article will discuss in section II(C), the NGPA departs significantly from these principles
respecting the pricing of most natural gas production by establishing, in
Title I, separate pricing categories based upon geological rather than actual or average cost considerations. Moreover, under the incremental pricing provisions of Title II, the price of natural gas is not based upon its cost
plus a reasonable rate of return, but instead is generally set by reference to
the price of oil.
B. IncrementalPricingPriorto the NGPA
Prior to the NGPA, the FERC's predecessor, the FPC, had addressed
the issue of incremental pricing in several cases. But as used by the FPC
incremental pricing meant something different from the way the term is
used in Title II of the NGPA. Simply stated, the FPC's version of incre38. The application of this regulatory formula to thousands of individual producers
proved to be impracticable. It has been estimated that there were 4500 natural gas producers in business when the FPC initiated area rate proceedings in 1960. C. HAWKINS, THE
FIELD PRICE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 37 (1969).
39. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
40. 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 575 (footnote omitted).
41. 390 U.S. at 791.
42. Id. One commentator has suggested that the Court's acceptance of group or area
ratemaking for natural gas producers departs from the criteria established in Hope and other
prior cases, since area-rate pricing is "not necessarily adjusted to the reasonableness of the
resulting return to specific individual firms." J. Spengler, A CritiqueofAdministrative Regulation of Public Utilities in THE PUBLIC UTILITY PROBLEM VIEWED HISTORICALLY 176 (W.
Samuels & H. Trebing eds. 1972).
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mental pricing referred to a method of rate design whereby the acquisition
costs of new natural gas supplies are not averaged or "rolled in" with the
utility's other gas acquisition costs but are charged solely to the customer
or class of customers benefiting from the newly acquired gas.4 3 NGPA
incremental pricing differs from that practiced by the FPC; the former is
not based on the cost of the natural gas actually sold while the latter is
based upon costs.
The FPC generally employed the practice of "rolling in" the price of
new increments or additions of natural gas supply in its regulation of the
natural gas industry.' This methodology enabled the FPC to avoid the
onerous administrative task of assigning a different portion of the cost to
each of a large number of customers. It results, all other factors being
equal, "in all customers paying the same price of gas taken from the pipeline at the same point, and recognizes that all customers enjoy the benefits
of having the whole gas gathering and pipeline system."45
There have been situations, however, in which the FPC recognized that
incremental pricing of natural gas supplies was appropriate. In Montana
Power Co. ,46 additional gas supplies were obtained from Canada and
pipelines were constructed to meet the requirements of one customer. Although the new facilities fed into the existing distribution system, and the
new and old gas was commingled, the FPC charged all the costs on an
incremental basis to Anaconda Copper Mining Company. The FPC justified this exception to the general rule favoring rolled-in pricing because of
the unique situation; all the gas was imported with the explicit limitation
that it meet the needs of one particular customer.4 7
Subsequent to Montana Power, the FPC applied incremental pricing to
certain sources of an interstate pipeline's general system supply. Application of this rate design to the pricing of relatively expensive supplemental
natural gas supplies 48 had grown with the increasing gap between the historic cost of gas and the cost of attaching new supplies to replace the
43. See, e.g., Battle Creek Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
44. See, e.g., Neueces Indus. Gas Co., 45 F.P.C. 1224 (1971); Kansas-Nebraska Nat.
Gas Co., Inc., 25 F.P.C. 448 (1961); El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 260 (1959); Trunkline
Gas Co., 21 F.P.C. 704 (1959); American La. Pipe Line Co., 13 F.P.C. 380 (1954); Panhandle
E. Pipe Line Co., 10 F.P.C. 185 (1951); Trunkline Gas Supply Co., 8 F.P.C. 250 (1949).
45. Battle Creek Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
46. 11 F.P.C. 1 (1952).
47. Id at 9.

48. Supplemental gas is usually defined as gas acquired from unconventional sources
and/or through unconventional techniques; for example, Alaskan and imported natural gas,
liquefied natural gas, synthetic natural gas.
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dwindling flow from conventional sources.4 9
In Columbia LNG Corp., which involved liquefied natural gas (LNG)
imported from Algeria as the incremental gas supply, the FPC conditioned
certificates issued under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act 5 ' upon the requirement that the applicants sell the LNG on an incrementally priced
basis. It rejected the application of rolled-in pricing, reasoning that this
rate design methodology would be contrary to the public interest since it
disguises the economic cost of a relatively expensive natural gas supply.5 2
The FPC required the pipeline to condition sales to its distributor customers upon the individual distributor's agreement to sell the LNG to its customers under incrementally priced rate schedules. In this manner, the
FPC attempted to insure that the economic cost of the LNG would be
"flowed through" to the ultimate consumer.5 3
On rehearing,54 the FPC eliminated, as administratively impractical, the
condition requiring distributors purchasing LNG to sell such gas at the
burner tip under separate incremental rate schedules but stated that the
policy of applying incremental pricing "is predicated upon considerations
of economic principles, efficient allocation of resources, distributor flexibility, and consumer protection. ' 55 In a concurring statement, Commissioners Walker and Moody articulated their rationale for requiring
incremental pricing of relatively high cost natural gas supplies: "[Ilt is not
economically rational to sell a product over an extended period of time for
less than its full cost." 56 The concurring statement set forth the following
policy reasons for applying incremental pricing to the certification of an
energy project: (1) gas to be sold on an incrementally priced basis would
provide a better test of the potential market for the new supply; (2) rolledin pricing of the high cost gas would result in inequitable subsidization by
high priority customers who would have to bear part of the cost of maintaining a supply for low priority users; and (3) incremental pricing affords
distributors the freedom to choose whether it is in their best interest to
49. See generally OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, INCREMENTAL PRICING OF SUPPLEMENTAL GAS (Aug. 1976).
50. 47 F.P.C. 1624 (1972). See generally Pierce, Natural Gas Rate Design: A Neglected

Issue, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1089, 1110-14 (1978).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1976).
52. 47 F.P.C. at 1639.
53. Id at 1641. Section 1(b) of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717a(b) (1976), precludes the

Commission from asserting jurisdiction over sales made by distribution companies. Nevertheless, the effect of the Commission's opinion was to indirectly require incremental pricing
to the burner tip.
54. Columbia LNG Corp., 48 F.P.C. 723 (1972).
55. Id at 730.
56. Id at 736 (Comm'rs Walker & Moody, concurring).
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contract for fully costed gas supply, or to seek alternative sources of supply
which may be more economical.57
On judicial review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Columbia LNG Corp. v. FederalPower Commission,58 although
not disapproving of the FPC's application of incremental pricing, remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing.5 9 On
remand,6 ° while not rejecting the concept of incremental pricing, the FPC
reversed its position and authorized rolled-in pricing for the imported
LNG.6 The FPC reasoned that "[t]he features of incremental pricing that
' 62
were persuasive to the prior Commission are not predominant today,
particularly in light of the deteriorating supply situation 6 3 and the fact that
the price of the proposed LNG imports was now competitive with that of
domestic natural gas supplies. 6' The FPC stated, however, that although
supplemental supplies such as LNG had become increasingly important in
maintaining an adequate base load supply for high priority customers, its
determination to employ rolled-in pricing in Columbia LNG Corp. was
"not intended to signal a precedent to be applied in other supplemental
supply projects which may come before us in the future."65
Only a few months after its decision on remand in Columbia LNG, the
57. Id at 736-37.
58. 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1974).
59. The court was concerned that the Commission had inadequately explored the inherent problems and ramifications of the new rate design. The court noted that "[nlo testimony
was taken as to the administrative problems which might arise, what the cost of the implementation might be, or how the public interest could be best served." Id at 654.
60. Columbia LNG Corp., 18 PUB. U. REP. 4th, 359 (1977).
61. See Pierce, supra note 50, at 1114-15.
62, 18 PUB. U. REP. 4th at 369.
63. The shortage of natural gas has been judicially recognized. See, e.g., FPC v.
Louisana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 626 (1972); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 467
F.2d 361, 362-63 & n.l (D.C. Cir. 1972); Monsanto Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See also Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 35; Mogel, supra note 4.
64. The Commission declared:
A critical distinction in the current situation is the higher costs of domestic supply.
The new national rate established in Opinion Nos. 770 and 770-A allows the producers to collect $1.42 per Mcf for all new gas delivered to the interstate market.
This supplemental LNG supply which will provide a substantial portion of these
pipelines' supply cannot be viewed as an "expensive exotic supply." Its price is
competitive with the new national rate. Estimates for the cost of deliveries of new
gas from conventional sources are comparable to the cost of this LNG supply.
Once in the pipeline, the characteristics of the supplemental supply are indistinguishable from those from conventional sources.
18 PUB. U. REP. 4th at 369 (footnote omitted). The price of the regasified LNG upon entering each of the three purchasing pipelines' system was $1.66, $1.7 1, and $1.81 per MMBtu.
Id at 366-67.
65.

18 PUB. U. REP. 4th at 370.
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FPC ruled in Trunkline LNG Co. ,66 that incremental rather than rolled-in
pricing was the appropriate rate design method for that particular LNG
import project. The Commission distinguished Trunkline from Columbia
LNG, reasoning that the element of roughly competitive prices between
new domestic production and the LNG imports present in Columbia LNG
was lacking, since the proposed imports were more than twice as costly as
new domestic production. 67 In addition to this significant price differential, the FPC based its determination to require incremental pricing on the
following:
If the cost of LNG is rolled-in with cheaper old gas, consumers
will be given "incorrect signals" regarding the scarcity and costliness of supplemental gas supplies. "Consumers will be able to
purchase these supplies for less than their cost of production and
transportation." Use of the incremental method discourages the
inefficient use of the gas because the LNG will be subject to the
market test of whether its users value the LNG enough to pay the
true cost of supplying them with this expensive gas. .

.

. To al-

low the LNG to be marketed on a rolled-in basis would, in effect,
create an artificial market for the imported gas

. .

. [T]o the ex-

tent that the LNG is incrementally priced at each stage of its sale
and resale, all customers, including retail customers, are given the
appropriate economic incentive to consider its actual cost in relation to the cost of other options, including conservation.6 8
Upon rehearing,6 9 the FPC once again reversed itself, ruling that the costs
of the LNG imports should be rolled-in rather than incrementally priced.7"
The Commission did not specifically address most of the policy reasons
which had initially persuaded it to mandate incremental pricing, but instead asserted that requiring incremental rate design would "render the
66. Op. No. 796 (Apr. 29, 1977); [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) - 11,942 (reprinted in
part).
67. Id slip op. at 25.
68. Id. slip op. at 6. Commissioner Holloman, dissenting, harshly disagreed:
Admittedly, the idea of incremental pricing has a certain appeal as an abstract
theory and is a proper subject for continued study as a philosophical concept of
economic policy. However, absent special circumstances and an amendment to the
Natural Gas Act extending this Commission's pricing jurisdiction past the city-gate
to the burner tip, it remains not only unworkable and impractical, but contrary to
the public interest as well. I agree with the majority that the price involved in these
sales is an element to be considered. However, this distinction alone is far from
sufficient to overcome the sound case against incremental pricing set forth in Op.
No. 786.
Id at 1.
69. Trunkline LNG Co. (Op. No. 796-A), 20 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4th 310 (1977).
70. Id at 314. See also Pierce, supra note 50, at 1116-17.
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project unfinanceable. 1
The FPC's decisionmaking respecting the application of non-Title II incremental pricing versus rolled-in pricing was a precursor of the vigorous
congressional debate accompanying the incremental pricing provisions of
Title II of the NGPA. The significance of the FPC's decision as between
rolled-in or incremental pricing is that the choice of rolled-in pricing although based upon true costs - produces a subsidy. This occurs because under rolled-in pricing all utility consumers share the costs of the
new energy supplies although they benefit only a limited class of the utility's consumers. In contrast, Title II incremental pricing subsidizes a majority of a utility's consumers at the expense of a limited number of
consumers. Whether the NGPA choice is administratively feasible or wise
policy requires the test of experience.

C Overview of the Natural Gas Policy Act
After extended debate in the halls of Congress and elsewhere,7 2 the
NGPA became law on November 9, 1978. 73 President Carter initiated
71. 20 PUB. U. REP. 4th at 314. In modifying the certificate to allow rolled-in rather
than incremental pricing, the FCP acknowledged a statement filed by President Carter's
Energy Resources Council (ERC):
[Clalling the Commission's attention to § 414 of the proposed National Energy Act
transmitted by the President to the Congress on April 29, 1977. According to the
ERC, the policies and positions considered in drafting § 414, which is entitled "Incremental Pricing of Natural Gas," are similar to those considered by the Commission in Opinion No. 796. The ERC explains, however, that whereas Opinion No.
796 provides for full marginal cost pricing of a specific source, § 414 provides that
the costs of all above-average-cost gas supplies will be allocated to low-priority
users until the burner-tip prices for such users reach the prices of substitute fuels.
Id. at 311. It is likely that the FPC's lack of jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act to
extend incremental pricing past the city-gate to the burner-tip was instrumental in disregarding the incremental pricing provisions proposed in the President's energy bill.
72. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S16245 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Abourezk) ("IThe natural gas bill ...
is a lousy, stinking bill."); id at S14879 (daily ed.
Sept. I1, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hansen) ("[T]his proposed bill . . . is so full of nooks,
crannies, gradations, splotches of color here and there that a visual representation would
look like a Jackson Pollock painting.
... ); id at S16262 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Byrd of W. Va.) (". . . it is to the credit of this Senate that the ...
Conference Report . . . represents a legislative milestone and not a legislative tombstone. For
months we have read about the imminent demise of this legislation. . . . [T]he chronicle of
this conference report has wavered between the front pages and the obituary pages"). See
generaly MacAvoy, supra note 17, at 819-20; Comment, supra note 8, at 460-64.
73. The NGPA was only one part of the comprehensive National Energy Act, which is
comprised of the following five statutes: the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of
1978, 92 Stat. 3206 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 23, 42 U.S.C.); the Powerplant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42,
45, 49 U.S.C.); the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 16 U.S.C.); the Energy Tax Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified in
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consideration of the bill which became the NGPA by submitting draft legislation to Congress on April 29, 1977, proposing permanent price controls
on all natural gas sales,74 in place of the existing federal price controls on
only the production of gas sold for resale in interstate commerce.75
On August 5, 1977, the House passed the administration's natural gas
legislation as H.R. 8444 with only minor modifications.76 H.R. 8444 mandated permanent price controls on both intrastate and interstate sales of
natural gas. The bill also defined "new natural gas" and established a federal price ceiling for this gas related to the average refiner acquisition cost
of domestically produced crude oil. The initial price was established at
77
$1.75 per MMBtu, with increases tied to increases in crude oil CoStS.
H.R. 8444 also included an incremental pricing mechanism for passing
through price increases by both interstate and intrastate pipelines to lowpriority natural gas users, until the price of gas to these users reached the
scattered sections of 23, 26 U.S.C.), and the NGPA. In addition to the NGPA, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act of 1978,
are of significance to the natural gas industry.
By way of summary, the Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978 establishes II voluntary
standards on rate design for consideration by state regulatory authorities, retail standards for
activities by natural gas utilities, a policy favoring industrial cogeneration facilities, FERC
jurisdiction to require interconnection of electric power transmission facilities, funding to
assist state implementation and consumer intervention in proceedings, procedures applicable to natural gas conservation by local distribution companies, procedures to facilitate the
voluntary conversion of facilities from natural gas to heavy fuel oil, authority for the President to declare a natural gas supply emergency, and an amendment to the NGA providing
for the transportation of natural gas sold by a producer to a high priority user who consumes
such gas.
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 provides for: (1) the prohibition
against the use of oil or natural gas in new electric utility generation facilities or in new
industrial boilers with a fuel heat input rate of 100 million Btu's per hour or greater, unless
exemptions are granted; (2) requirement that existing coal capable facilities use coal and
non-coal capable units to use coal-oil mixtures; (3) limitation of natural gas use by existing
utility power plants to the proportion of total fuel used during 1974-1976, and the requirement that there be no switches from oil to gas; (4) an $800 million loan program to assist
utilities in raising necessary funds for pollution control; (5) supplemental authority to prohibit use of natural gas in small boilers for space heating and in decorative outdoor lighting
and (6) the allocation of coal in emergencies.
74. See

COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL

H.R. Doc. No. 138, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
75. Prior to the passage of the NGPA there was no federal price regulation of natural
gas sold for resale in intrastate commerce. Sales for resale in interstate commerce were
regulated by the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1976). See notes 19-71 and accompanying
text supra.
76. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which included the natural gas legislation,
was approved by a vote of 244 to 177. 123 CONG. REC. H8826-27 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977).
See Nordhaus, supra note 18, at 846.
77. H.R. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENERGY ACT,

ENCE REPORT].
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78
Btu equivalency of the cost of substitute fuels.

The Senate, however, significantly altered the administration and
House-passed natural gas pricing proposals by adopting the Pearson-Bentson amendment.7 9 The Senate bill, S. 2104, would not have extended price
controls to flowing intrastate gas, and would have continued existing federal regulation of flowing interstate gas. 80 Deregulation of the price of new
onshore gas would occur within two years and the price of new offshore
federal domain gas within five years. 8' Pending deregulation, the Senate
bill established interim price ceilings at a level tied to the cost of imported
fuel oil. 82 Moreover, S. 2104's incremental pricing provision, which was
limited to consumers served directly or indirectly by interstate pipelines,
required the Commission to allocate costs of old natural gas for rate purposes to high priority users until the price of natural gas to low priority
users equalled the reasonable cost of substitute fuel oil.8 3
Due to the differences between the House and Senate bills, a Conference
Committee was convened on October 18, 1977.84 Following an effort to
resolve the differences between the two bills, the Conference Committee
adopted compromise legislation and issued its report on August 18, 1978.85
After extensive debate in the Senate from September 11-27, 1978,86 the
Senate agreed to the Conference Report on September 27, 1978.87 The
House then considered the Conference Report on October 13-14, 1978, and
adopted it by a vote of 231-168 on October 14, 1978.88 Having passed
Congress, the NGPA was signed by the President and became law on November 9, 1978.
Through the NGPA, Congress abandoned the regulatory approach of
the Natural Gas Act, which applied traditional public utility regulatory
78. Id at 67.
79. Amend. No. 1039, 123 CONG. REC. S 16323-25 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977). The amendment was approved by a vote of 50-46. Id at S 16323. The Senate then adopted its own bill,
S. 2104, as amended, by a voice vote. Id at S16325.
80. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 68.

81. Id
82. Id
83. Id.at 68-69.
84. For a general overview of the legislative maneuvers, see Ligon, Problemsof ContractualAuthorization to Collect NGP,4 Wellhead Prices, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 551, 552-54 (1979).
85. S. REP. No. 1126, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
86. The debate included the defeat of a motion by a 57-42 vote to resubmit the bill to
conference. 124 CONG. REC. S15420-21 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978).
87. The Senate agreed to the Conference Report by a vote of 57-42. 124 CONG. REC.
S16265 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978).
88. 124 CONG. REC. H13427 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
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principles to sales of natural gas.8 9 The NGPA generally rejected the use
of cost-based controls on the wellhead price of natural gas sold in interstate commerce, 9° substituting a statutory price control formula applicable
to both intrastate and interstate natural gas sales. This formula relies upon
a system of classifying and pricing gas based upon the circumstances of its
production and sale. As a result, the FERC is generally no longer required
to inquire into producer costs or establish permissible rates of return.9 '
According to a congressional report, the "central issue" during consideration of the pricing policy, generated by the perceived need to eliminate
the "artificial" distinction between the interstate and intrastate markets,
was "whether market equalization should occur through deregulation of
the interstate market, as in the Senate bill, or through regulation of the
intrastate market as in the House bill.",92 The NGPA combined both approaches.
The uniform, national price policy for intrastate as well as interstate natural gas production, as provided in the House bill, was adopted. 93 Title I
94
of the NGPA substituted a series of statutory maximum price levels applicable to specifically defined categories of both interstate and intrastate
"first sales" 95 of natural gas, for the former system of price regulation re89. See notes 19-71 and accompanying text supra. See generally Note, Regulatory Opportunity and Ambiguity in the Searchfor High-Cost Natural Gas, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 641,
641-43 (1979).
90. See SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY & POWER OF HOUSE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF H.R. 5289, NATURAL GAS POLICY

ACT OF 1978 1 (Comm. Print, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
91.

See generally FERC, SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS S. REP. No. 426, 95th Cong.,

2d Sess. 12-13 (1978) (accompanying letter from Charles B. Curtis, Chairman of the FERC,
to Sen. Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Sept. 8, 1978); Norhaus, supra note 18, at 854.
92. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 90, at 2.
93. Representative Dingell commented as follows respecting the uniform pricing provisions:
The most important provisions of the bill are those which deal with wellhead pricing. These establish a schedule of price ceilings applicable to specifically defined
categories of gas production. The result is the creation of a single, national market
for natural gas and an end to the economic distortions which accompanied the
outdated mode of regulation under the Natural Gas Act.
124 CONG. REC. H13114 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). See generally Comment, supra note 8, at
437-39.
94. The NGPA established 8 new major categories and numerous subcategories of natural gas production. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3319 (Supp. I 1978). See generally Ligon, supra
note 84, at 554-55; Nordhaus, supra note 18, at 849-53.
95. Section 2(21) of the NGPA defines "first sale" as follows:
(A) General rule. - The term "first sale" means any sale of any volume of natural
gas -

(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline;
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specting only interstate sales. Under Title I, different pricing treatment is
accorded production and sales of gas within the specific categories; the appropriate category being determined by reference to geological information, production history, field records, prior contractual arrangements, and
information of a similar nature.96 The prices are adjusted monthly for inflation,9 7 but the prices of certain categories are allowed to increase faster
than inflation to provide additional incentives for exploration and development.9 8
Title I incorporated, in part, the approach taken in the Senate bill by
providing wellhead price deregulation for most categories of gas in 1985.99
This delay in deregulation was intended to provide "sufficient time for
gradual interim pricing mechanisms to raise the price of new gas from
(ii) to any local distribution company;
(iii) to any person for use by such person;
(iv) which precedes any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii); and
(v) which precedes or follows any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv)
and is defined by the Commission as a first sale in order to prevent circumvention of any maximum lawful price established under this chapter.
(B) Certain sales not included. - Clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of subparagraph (A)
shall not include the sale of any volume of natural gas by any interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or local distribution company, or any affiliate thereof,
unless such sale is attributable to volumes of natural gas produced by such
interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or local distribution company, or any
affiliate thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 3301(21) (Supp. 11 1978).
96. See Preamble to the Interim Regulations implementing the NGPA, 43 Fed. Reg.
56,448, 56,452, 56,453 (1978). See generally MacAvoy, supra note 17, at 821. By way of
example, a "new, onshore production well" is defined by § 103 of the NPGA as:
Any new well (other than a well located on the Outer Continental Shelf) (1) the surface drilling of which began on or after February 19, 1977;
(2) which satisfies applicable Federal or State well-spacing requirements, if any;
and
(3) which is not within a proration unit (A) which was in existence at the time the surface drilling of such well began;
(B) which was applicable to the reservoir from which such natural gas is
produced; and
(C) which applied to a well (i) which produced natural gas in commercial
quantities or (ii) the surface drilling of which was begun before February 19,
1977, and which was thereafter capable of producing natural gas in commercial quantities.
15 U.S.C. § 3313(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
97. Section 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 33 11(a) (Supp. 11 1978), prescribes the method for computing the annual inflation adjustment factor for NGPA ceiling prices.
98. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3312(b) (Supp. I 1978) (new natural gas and certain outer
continental shelf wells); 15 U.S.C. § 3318(a) (stripper wells) (Supp. 11 1978).
99. For the deregulation provisions established in § 121 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3331
(Supp. I 1978), see note 17 supra.
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historically underpriced levels to a point where the market can clear. ' ' 1°°
The price of gas from high-cost gas wells' was to be deregulated after one
year, while flowing gas, for which little additional economic incentive was
necessary to encourage continued production, remains regulated indefinitely.''
As discussed in section III of this article, Title II of the NGPA' 0 2 requires the incremental pricing of portions of the acquisition cost of certain
categories of gas, set forth in Title I, which exceed specified levels. Title
II ° 3 authorizes the President to declare a natural gas supply emergency
under certain circumstances, 0 4 and to permit interstate pipelines and distribution companies to purchase natural gas in order to alleviate the emerIf these
gency upon such contract terms as the President may require.'
purchases are insufficient to meet the needs of high priority customers, the
President may allocate certain natural gas supplies. 0 6 Moreover, Title III
allows the FERC to permit interstate pipelines to transport gas on behalf
of any intrastate pipeline or local distribution company, 0 7 and to authorize intrastate pipelines to sell to,' 08 or transport 1°9 gas on behalf of interstate pipelines or distribution companies served by interstate pipelines.
Title IV" 0 of the NGPA sets forth a federal natural gas curtailment
policy. The purpose of this title is to assure that gas supplies for certain
essential agricultural uses and essential industrial process or feedstock uses
generally will not be curtailed unless curtailment is required to protect
enumerated high priority users. 1 "
Title V" 2 grants the FERC various rulemaking" 13 and enforcement
100. 124 CONG. REC. H13114 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
101. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 90, at 2. See generally MacAvoy, supra note
17, at 820-23; Comment, supra note 8, at 449-59.
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3348 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 120-97 and accompanying text
infra.
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3361-3375 (Supp. I 1978).
104. Id § 3361.
105. Id § 3362(a).
106. Id § 3363.
107. Id § 3371(a)(1).
108. Id § 3371(b).
109. Id § 337 1(a)(2).
110. Id. §§ 3391-3394.
11. See Mogel, Food,Fuel and FederalCurtailment Regulations,56Cu1.-KENT L. REv.
301 (1980). See also Harrison & Formby, supra note 33, at 72-76.
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3411-3417 (Supp. 11 1978).
113. The FERC is authorized to "prescribe, issue, amend, and rescind such rules and
orders as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out its functions" under the NGPA.
15 U.S.C. § 3411(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
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powers.' 14 Additionally, the FERC is authorized to review determinations
of eligibility for qualifying natural gas production and sales under the categories established in Title I.115 Title V also sets forth the procedure for
obtaining judicial review of Commission action pursuant to the NGPA.16
Title VI, 1 17 the final section of the NGPA, coordinates the provisions of
the NGPA with the NGA, setting forth the areas where utility-type regulation pursuant to the NGA is still retained.
It is apparent that a fundamental purpose of the NGPA is to provide
immediately higher incentive prices" 8 for natural gas pending deregulation, in order to encourage increased production of natural gas." 9 The
following section of this article will discuss Title II of the NGPA, which
was intended in part to shield high priority users from the higher natural
gas incentive prices resulting from this Act.
III.

TITLE

II OF THE NGPA

[T]his bill is nothing but a masterpiece of confusion. It is so
114. Section 504 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3414 (Supp. 111978), empowers the FERC to
impose substantial civil and criminal penalties and other sanctions for violations of the
NGPA.
115. Title V requires that before a producer collects the NGPA price for certain categories of gas (new natural gas under 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c); gas from the Outer Continental Shelf
under 15 U.S.C. § 3312(d); new, onshore production wells under 15 U.S.C., § 3313(c); and
stripper well gas under 15 U.S.C. § 3318(b)), it must first obtain a determination that such
gas actually qualifies for that price. Determinations of eligibility are to be made by the state
agency regulating gas production, if the gas involved is located on lands subject to state
jurisdiction, or by a federal agency such as the U.S. Geological Survey, if the gas is located
on lands under federal domain. These determinations are subject to the FERC's review and
are appealable to the courts only if the FERC remands or reverses the determination of the
state or federal agency. 15 U.S.C. § 3413(a)-(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
Pending a final determination, producers may collect the maximum lawful price for which
they believe the gas qualifies pursuant to the FERC's implementing regulations. Any
amount collected in excess of the subsequently determined maximum lawful price must be
refunded, with interest. Id § 3413(e).
116. Id § 3416.
117. Id §§ 3431-3432.
118. Although it is difficult to assess accurately the economic impact of the NGPA, the
Energy Information Administration of the Department of Energy has prepared an analysis
which estimated that for the period 1977-1985, the NGPA would increase producer revenues
by 13.7 to 23.5 billion dollars and would elicit an additional one trillion cubic feet of natural
gas production. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, AN EVALUATION OF NATURAL
GAS PRICING PROPOSALS (June 14, 1978) (Analysis Mem. No. AM/IA-7802).

119. In floor debate just before the final Senate vote on the natural gas bill, Senator
Jackson, the Senate manager of the bill, stated: "[T]he legislation that is before us for this
final legislative act in the Senate will give us a better law than we have today in the field of
natural gas pricing and delivery. . . . [Ilt will provide the incentives for increased production." 124 CONG. REC. S16264 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
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murky in its utter complexity, other than being a lawyers' and
accountants' relief act, that it does nothing to advance the energy
policy of this country. 2 °
A.

Introduction

This commentary on the NGPA, spoken during the House debate, exemplifies congressional uncertainty as to both the efficacy and results that
would arise from the NGPA. The conference report accompanying the
NGPA recognized that the "implementation of [the Title II incremental
pricing provisions] . . . will be complex."'' There are few who would
quarrel with the observation that the incremental pricing provisions of Title II of the NGPA invoke "utter complexity"' 2 2 in an already rarefied
field.
Generally, Title II mandates the incremental pricing of certain
purchased gas costs incurred by interstate pipelines. This is effectuated by
requiring amounts paid in excess of specified ceiling prices for certain categories of natural gas to be segregated into a special account by each pipeline, and then passed through as a surcharge to certain industrial and
boiler fuel users until the gas cost to these users equals the cost of an alternative fuel. Such a surcharge, however, may not raise the gas cost to the
industrial user above the cost of the fuel oil which could be used by the
industrial customer as an alternative to natural gas.
This section will discuss the general intent of the incremental pricing
provisions, including an analysis of the legislative history of Title II of the
NGPA. The facilities or users subject to incremental pricing pursuant to
sections 201,123 202,24 and 20625 will be discussed next. Finally, this section will address the acquisition costs subject to incremental pricing pursuant to section 203126 and the manner of passing through these costs set
27
forth in section 204 of the NGPA.1
B. Intent of IncrementalPricing
The intent of Title II of the NGPA is two-fold. First, it is to serve as a
market ordering device by inducing industrial users to exercise their
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

124 CONG. REC. H13131 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 95.
124 CONG. REC. H13131 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
15 U.S.C. § 3341 (Supp. 11 1978).
Id § 3342.
Id. § 3346.
Id § 3343.
Id § 3344.

1978) (remarks of Rep. Anderson).
1978) (remarks of Rep. Anderson).
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purchasing leverage to prevent interstate pipeline companies from bidding
up the price of deregulated natural gas.' 28 Second, Title II is intended to
shift the immediate wellhead price increases resulting from Title I of the
NGPA 129 primarily to industrial users, thereby protecting residential and
other "high priority" users from rapid price increases which could otherwise result from the new wellhead prices.' 30 According to Representative
Dingell, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power,
upon deregulation of certain categories of natural gas, incremental pricing
is to substitute for wellhead price controls as a "market ordering device." 131 A further goal is to eliminate potential market distortions before
132
such deregulation occurs.
Title II reflects a primary congressional concern: precluding interstate
pipelines from averaging or rolling-in the expensive volumes of deregulated gas with the volumes of less expensive flowing regulated gas. In the
legislative debate preceding enactment of the NGPA, it was contended
that deregulation would drive new gas prices far above long-run market
levels as a result of a bidding war between pipelines. This in turn would
push the price of unregulated new gas to high levels.' 33 In its report accompanying H.R. 8444,1 34 a forerunner of the NGPA, the House Ad Hoc
Committee on Energy stated that upon sudden deregulation:
an interstate pipeline will be able to bid extremely high prices for
new supplies of natural gas, which even deregulation proponents
concede will be relatively small as compared to the volumes of
presently flowing natural gas. The interstate pipelines, unlike the
intrastate pipelines, are not constrained by a limited demand for
natural gas. Using rolled-in pricing, interstate pipelines can bid
the price of new supplies35 of natural gas to unprecedented levels
of $5 per Mcf or more.'
Title II incremental pricing was expected to eliminate this phenomenon
by focusing price increases primarily upon a pipeline's industrial custom128. See 126 CONG. REC. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
129. As of January 1, 1980, the NGPA ceiling prices for deliveries of natural gas in
January 1980 falling within §§ 102-109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3319 (Supp. 11 1978), excluding
high cost gas as defined in § 107(c)(l)-(4), id § 3317(c)(1)-(4), ranged from $.220 to $2.523
per million British thermal units (MMBtu). See 45 Fed. Reg. 7781-7782 (1980). Beginning
on November 1, 1979, the price of natural gas finally determined to be eligible as high cost
natural gas under § 107(c)(1)-(4), 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c)(1)-(4) (Supp. I 1978), is deregulated.
130. 124 CONG. REC. H13115 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
131. Id at H13114.
132. Id
133. Id at H13113-14.
134. H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., Vol. 11 (1977).
135. Id at 395.
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ers. By allowing the price of gas delivered to industrial customers to rise to
the level of alternative fuels, it was believed that the leverage of industrial
customers would limit the ability of pipelines to pass through high prices
for new gas. 136 Restrained by these passthrough limitations, Representative Dingell stated in floor debate that:
[P]ipelines will be forced to bid responsibly for deregulated supplies of gas or face a loss of customers and an associated reduction in throughput volumes and profits. . . .Incremental pricing
is not intended to achieve conservation of natural gas through
forced conversions of industrial users to other fuels. Instead, it is
intended to apply the leverage industrial customers have over
pipeline management in such a way that pipelines will be forced
to bid responsibly for new supplies of gas. Residential natural
gas consumers are thereby protected from sharp increases in gas
prices which would otherwise accompany deregulation. 37
Thus, Congress intended that Title II incremental pricing would place industrial users in a position of constraining their pipeline suppliers from
bidding up the price of deregulated natural gas.
Congress also recognized that it was necessary to employ a mechanism
that would not compel industrial users to forego interstate pipeline systems
and to convert to other fuels. Representative Dingell stated:
The [NGPA] will not drive industrial users off natural gas and
onto other fuels. Such a result would be contrary to the very purpose of the bill's provisions. . . . If incremental pricing in fact
drove industrial users to other fuels, the leverage these users have
with pipeline managements would be lost and the consumer protection aspects of incremental pricing would be seriously impaired. The conferees have provided38several statutory guarantees
against such an unintended result.
Since it was assumed that the price to industrial users could at most rise to
the level of alternative fuels, Representative Dingell believed that these
customers would not be compelled to convert to other fuels. 139 Moreover,
it was stated that "a broadening of incremental pricing to other industrial
users will give added assurances against forced conversions" to other fuels,
since "[w]ith more users sharing the load it is less likely that the price to
any single user will get high enough to force conversions."' 140 It was also
136. See 124 CONG. REC. H13114 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id That belief apparently was formulated when the price of fuel oil was approximately $12 per barrel. As of January 1, 1980, the price has increased to approximately $30
per barrel. Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1979, § A, at 22, col. 4.
140. 124 CONG. REC. H13115 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
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assumed that conversion would not take place, since "incremental pricing
is capped at the price of alternative fuels . . . [and thus] natural gas will
remain an attractively priced fuel even for incrementally priced industrial
users." 141
Representative Dingell commented in the floor debate on the NGPA
that a "highly beneficial side effect of the bill's incremental pricing provisions is that they will protect residential gas users from sharp price increases."' 4 2 Support of the NGPA by various congressmen was
conditioned, in part, upon the bill's provisions that would partially shield
residential consumers from the higher natural gas prices permitted by Title
I. Of note is the following colloquy between Senator Stone and Senator
Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, on the Senate floor
during the final debate on the NGPA:
MR. STONE. [Ils this [incremental pricing] provision in any
way intended to encourage industrial customers who are currently using natural gas to switch from natural gas to other fuels?
MR. JACKSON. The incremental pricing mechanism is in no
way intended to encourage industrial customers to switch from
using natural gas to other fuels. Instead, the incremental pricing
provision is intended to provide some protection from higher natural gas prices to certain gas customers,
in particular residential
43
and small commercial customers.
The legislative history of the Title II incremental pricing provisions
reveals Congress' two-fold objectives. First, it was believed that by placing
the initial cost of deregulated natural gas price increases primarily on industrial users, these users would have sufficient purchasing leverage to restrain their supplying pipelines from bidding up the price of deregulated
gas. Second, Title II incremental pricing was intended partially to shield
high priority natural gas users from the immediate impact of wellhead
price increases resulting from the natural gas pricing provisions established
in Title I of the NGPA. Whether the accomplishment of such objectives is
"naive" or "fanciful" awaits the test of application and time."
141. Id
142. Id at H13114.
143. 124 CONG. REC. S16236 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Stone and Sen.

Jackson). In the final floor debates it was stated that "[tihe Senate's intention with incremental pricing was to protect the consumer from higher prices." Id at S16239 (remarks of
Sen. Percy). Senator Glenn observed that incremental pricing "protects the individual residential user from drastic increases and places the major load onto industrial users for any
higher priced new gas flowing through the interstate system." Id at S16262.
144. See INSIDE F.E.R.C. (Nov. 26, 1979).
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Facilities Subject to Incremental Pricing

Title II mandates that the incremental pricing provisions be implemented in two phases. Pursuant to section 201 of the NGPA, 145 the FERC
was directed to promulgate and make effective within twelve months of
November 9, 1978:
a rule designed to provide for the passthrough, in accordance
with the provisions of this subchapter, of the costs of natural gas
which are (1) described in section 3343 of this title, [section 203] and
(2) incurred by any interstate pipeline ... .
The requirements of such a rule are to apply "with respect to the boiler
fuel use of natural gas by any industrial boiler fuel facility."' 147 Significantly, however, a statutory exemption from incremental pricing is provided in section 206 for electric utilities using natural gas as a boiler fuel in
on September
generating electricity. 4 8 The FERC issued its Phase I rule
49
28, 1979, which became effective on November 1, 1979.1
Section 202 of the NGPA5 ° directs the FERC to prescribe by May 9,
1980, a Phase II amendment to its Phase I rule. Under Phase II incremental pricing, the FERC may extend the incremental pricing program to
other non-boiler industrial users and mandate that such users be subject to
a surcharge to recover certain costs incurred by interstate pipelines' as
described in section 203.152 Specifically, the rule may expand the application of the incremental pricing program to: "any industrial facility which
is within a category defined by the Commission in such amendment as
subject thereunder to the requirements of such rule which is not exempt
under [Section 206 of the NGPA]."' 5 3 Unlike the Phase I regulations, the
FERC's Phase II rule is subject to a congressional review mechanism; either house of Congress may disapprove the rule within thirty calendar
In this regard,
days of continuous session after it has been submitted.'
145.

15 U.S.C. § 3341 (Supp. I 1978).

146.

Id. § 3341(a).

147. Id § 3341(b). See note 9 supra.
148.
149.

15 U.S.C. § 3346(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
18 C.F.R. § 282 (1979).

150.
151.
152.
153.

15 U.S.C. § 3342 (Supp. 11 1978).
Id § 3342(a)(1)(B).
Id § 3343.
Id. § 3342(b)(2).

154. Id § 3342(c). If either House adopts a resolution of disapproval, the FERC may

submit a different proposal to each House no earlier than six months after the resolution of
disapproval, and no later than two years after the date of adoption of any resolution of
disapproval. Id
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Senator Jackson commented during the floor debate immediately preceding the enactment of the NGPA: "I would note that this bill does not
compel incremental pricing with respect to any industrial use other than in
large boilers. Extension of incremental pricing beyond boiler use could be
prevented by a majority vote of either House of Congress 2 years from
now." ' On November 15, 1979, the FERC issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking in Phase II to extend incremental pricing to other industrial
56
facilities.
The scope of incremental pricing, however, is limited by the exemptions
established in section 206 of the NGPA. 5 7 Subsection 206(a) provides an
interim exemption for small industrial boiler fuel users in existence on the
date of enactment of the NGPA, if gas use by the facility does not exceed
"an average of 300 Mcf per day during any month of a base period determined appropriate by the Commission."' 5 8 This interim exemption will
last until the FERC prescribes and makes effective a permanent rule pursuant to subsection 206(a)(2).15 9 The permanent exemption, required to be
promulgated by May 9, 1980, will apply to certain small industrial boiler
fuel facilities in existence as of November 9, 1978, whose boiler fuel use
during the peak month of calendar year 1977 was the lesser of an average
of 300 Mcf per day, or such average daily rate of use as the FERC deems
necessary to ensure that the boiler fuel use permanently exempted by such
rule does not exceed five percent of all natural gas that the FERC estimates was transported by interstate pipelines for boiler fuel use during the
calendar year 1977.160
Subsection 206(b) of the NGPA, 16 ' grants a further statutory interim
exemption rule for any agricultural use of natural gas. "Agricultural use"
is defined as the use of natural gas:
(A) for agricultural production, natural fiber production,
natural fiber processing, food processing, food quality maintenance, irrigation pumping, or crop drying; or
(B) as a process fuel or feedstock in the production of ferti62
lizer, agricultural chemicals, animal feed, or food.
155. 124 CONG. REC. S16239 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
156. Rule Required Under § 202 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Proposed
Rulemaking and Public Hearings, Doc. No. RM80-10, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,170 (1979).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 3346 (Supp. I 1978).
158. Id § 3346(a)(1).
159. Id § 3346(a)(2)(A). Unlike the rule required by § 202, id § 3342, the permanent
exemption is not subject to congressional review.
160. Id § 3346(a)(2)(B).
161. Id § 3346(b).
162. Id § 3346(b)(3).
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This interim exemption continues until the FERC prescribes and makes
effective on May 9, 1980, a permanent rule exempting agricultural users
from incremental pricing. Agricultural uses will be exempt under the permanent rule only if the FERC determines that an alternative fuel or feedstock is not "economically practicable; or

. .

. reasonably available."' 6 3

The final statutory exemption from incremental pricing is set forth in
subsection 206(c).' 64 This subsection provides a permanent exemption for
schools, hospitals and similar institutions, qualifying cogeneration facilities, and electric utilities. The exemption of electric utilities, 65 which currently use a substantial amount of natural gas for generating electricity, is
a further significant reduction in the pool of natural gas users that are subject to incremental pricing.
Subsection 206(d) further authorizes the FERC to provide, by rule or
order, additional partial or complete exemptions for other nonexempt industrial facilities or categories. 166 The conference report explains that
these other exemptions "may deal with either who is covered by the [incremental pricing] rule or at what level any particular class of users covered
by the rule will be incrementally priced."' 167 It also indicates that the
FERC may grant partial exemptions lowering the substitute fuel level applicable to any particular class of nonexempt users below the level that
would otherwise apply. 168 However, subsection 206(d)(2) provides that
any rule which grants an exemption under this subsection is subject to con163. Id. § 3346(b)(2). Although the statute conditions the permanent exemption in the

disjunctive (i.e. -"economically practicable" or "reasonably available"), the Conference
Report uses the conjunctive, stating that the exemption applies only if the Commission determines that an alternative fuel or feedstock "is both economically practicable and reasonably available." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 102.
The potential limitations on the scope of incremental pricing because of the statutory
agricultural use exemption is significant. American agriculture is energy intensive, as illustrated by a Department of Agriculture estimate that 22% of the nation's energy supply is
used in the production of food and fiber, placing the agricultural sector as the third largest

industrial user of energy after the steel manufacturing and petroleum refining industries.
Approximately one-third of that energy use is derived from natural gas, and is used primarily for fertilizer, fuel, irrigation, pesticides and seed drying. See Mogel, supra note I 11. It
is likely that for many of these uses, there is no alternative fuel or feedstock that is economically practicable or reasonably available. Consequently, the statutory agricultural use exemption will significantly reduce the pool of available industrial users that will be subject to
an incremental pricing surcharge.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 3346(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
165. Subsection 2(28) of the NGPA defines an "electric utility" as: "any person to the
extent such person is engaged in the business of the generation of electricity and sale, directly or indirectly, of electricity to the public." 15 U.S.C. § 3301(2)(28) (Supp. 11 1978).
166. Id. § 3346(d).
167. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 102.
168. Id

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:763

gressional review; either House of Congress may disapprove the rule
within thirty calendar days of continuous session after it has been submitted. 169
D.

The Mechanics of Incremental Pricing

Section 20417° of the NGPA specifies the manner in which gas acquisition costs subject to incremental pricing are to be passed through to nonexempt industrial users. Interstate pipelines must establish an incremental
pricing account and credit to it the costs subject to incremental pricing.
The amounts so credited are then passed through as a surcharge on the
total volumes of natural gas delivered, directly or indirectly, 7 ' to incrementally priced industrial facilities 7 2 for ultimate industrial use.' 73 The
surcharge allocates increases in natural gas prices to nonexempt facilities
until the price paid by these facilities at the burnertip is equal to the appropriate Btu equivalent cost of alternative fuel.' 74 A facility's surcharge is to
be reduced if an unadjusted surcharge would result in rates to that facility
which exceed the appropriate alternative fuel cost. This reduction is to be
borne by other nonexempt facilities served by the pipeline. Any amount
that a local distribution company does not recover from facilities it serves,
because the price would then exceed the Btu equivalent cost, reverts back
to the pipeline and is shared by all remaining nonexempt facilities served
by the pipeline that pay less than the alternative fuel price. When all such
nonexempt facilities reach the Btu-equivalency of the alternative fuel cost,
then "the passthrough will operate only to the extent necessary to maintain
rates and charges for industrial users at that equivalency," ' with any excess amounts "allocated in whatever manner by which the pipeline or local
169. 15 U.S.C. § 3346(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). The statute specifically authorizes Congress
to veto any rule promulgated under section 206(d)(i), id § 3346(d)(2), but does not refer to
any exemption order the FERC may issue pursuant to that section. However, the conference report states that "[any proposed exemption is required to be submitted to Congress."
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 102. This would appear to include exemption orders issued by the FERC.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 3344 (Supp. 11 1978).
171. Id § 3344(c)(2).
172. Subsection 204(g), 15 U.S.C. § 3344(g), defines the term "incrementally priced industrial facility" as: "any industrial facility subject to the requirements of the rule under
section 201 (including any amendment under section 202 to such rule)."
173. Subsection 204(h), 15 U.S.C. § 3344(h), provides that: "For purposes of this section,
the term 'industrial use,' when used with respect to natural gas, means the boiler fuel use of
natural gas (as defined in section 201(c)(2)) and any other use defined, by rule, by the Commission as an industrial use."
174. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 98.
175. Id at 99.
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' 176
distribution company is permitted to recover normal costs.
Section 204 of the NGPA 177 provides that the alternative fuel cost limit
on the incremental pricing mechanism in a region, unless the FERC determines otherwise, shall be the average price paid by industrial users for No.
2 fuel oil in that region.' 78 In certain cases the FERC may, by rule or
order, reduce the appropriate alternative fuel cost to a level not lower than
the price paid for No. 6 fuel oil by industrial users on a regional basis.
However, FERC must determine that such a reduction is necessary to prevent rate increases for residential, small commercial, and other high priority natural gas users resulting from a reallocation of costs caused by
conversion of an industrial facility from natural gas to other fuels. This
determination may be made on a case-by-case basis, or regionally by category of user on a pipeline-by-pipeline basis. 179

Section 203180 of the NGPA sets forth the "first sale acquisition cost" 8 '
of natural gas that must be placed in a pipeline's incremental pricing account. This section further provides that the first sale acquisition cost of
natural gas in certain enumerated categories 182 which exceeds the incremental pricing threshold must be passed through.' 83 The incremental
pricing threshold for any month initially is defined in subsection 203(c) as
$1.48/MMBtu, for March, 1978, "and for each month thereafter, the
amount determined for the preceding month multiplied by the monthly
equivalent of the annual inflation adjustment factor [as defined in section
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
(Supp.

Id

15 U.S.C. § 3344 (Supp. 11 1978).
Id § 3344(e).
See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 100.
15 U.S.C. § 3343 (Supp. I 1978).
The term "first sale acquisition cost" is defined in § 203(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 3343(b)
11 1978), as follows:
(A) the price paid, per million Btu's, in any first sale of such natural gas, in the
case of any natural gas produced in the United States and acquired in such first
sale; and
(B) the price paid for such natural gas, per million Btu's, at the point of entry to
the United States, in the case of natural gas or liquefied natural gas imported into
the United States.
182. The categories are as follows: (1) new natural gas [as defined in § 102(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 3312(c)]; (2) gas delivered under rollovers into the interstate system of previously intrastate
gas [as defined in § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 3316]; (3) gas produced from new, onshore production
wells [as defined in § 103(c), 15 U.S.C. § 3313(c)]; (4) liquefied natural gas imported into the
U.S. (subject to § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 3347); and (5) sales of gas pursuant to § 311, 15 U.S.C. §
3371 (which authorizes certain transportation arrangements between intrastate and interstate pipelines and certain sales by intrastate pipelines to interstate pipelines or local distribution systems).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 3343(a)(1), (2), (3), (4) & (10) (Supp. 11 1978).
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101(a)] applicable for such month."' 8 4 Thus, any first sale acquisition cost
in the five enumerated categories exceeding this incremental pricing
threshold must be passed through to the nonexempt industrial facilities.
The remaining categories of gas defined by Title I generally are not controlled by the incremental pricing threshold for determining that portion of
the cost to be passed through. Under subsection 203(a)(6)' 85 any portion
of the acquisition cost of stripper well gas' 8 6 that exceeds the maximum
price for new gas under section 102 must be placed in the incremental
pricing account and passed through. The amount of incrementally priced
high cost gas' 87 is computed under a formula' 8 presumably intended to
maintain the incentive price and marketing requirements of increased production of this category of gas. Natural gas produced from the Prudhoe
Bay Unit of Alaska and transported through the transportation system approved under the Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976189 is
also subject to treatment under a unique formula. Subsection 203(a)(8) of
the NGPA' 90 mandates incremental pricing of that portion paid for such
Alaska natural gas which exceeds the cost computed under section 109
($1.45 per MMBtu as of April, 1977, plus inflation adjustment), plus any
amount paid to any person other than the producer for gathering, process184. Id § 3343(c).
185. Id § 3343(a)(6).
186. Stripper well natural gas is defined in § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 3318(b) (Supp. 11 1978),
as nonassociated natural gas produced during any month from a well, if:
(A) during the preceding 90-day production period, such well produced nonassociated natural gas at a rate which did not exceed an average of 60 Mcf per production day during such period; and
(B) during such period such well produced at its maximum efficient rate of flow,
determined in accordance with recognized conservation practices designed to maximize the ultimate recovery of natural gas.
187. High cost gas is defined in § 107(c), 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c) (Supp. 11 1978), as natural
gas:
(1) produced from any well the surface drilling of which began on or after February 19, 1977, if such production is from a completion location which is located at
a depth of more than 15,000 feet;
(2) produced from geopressured brine;
(3) occluded natural gas produced from coal seams;
(4) produced from Devonian shale; and
(5) produced under such other conditions as the Commission determines to present extraordinary risks or costs.
188. Section 203(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 3343(a)(7) (Supp. 11 1978), provides that the portion
of the acquisition cost of high cost gas which exceeds 1300 of the Btu-equivalent of the
landed cost of No. 2 fuel oil in New York harbor "during an appropriate period preceding
the month during which delivery of such natural gas occurs," is required to be passed
through to nonexempt industrial facilities.
189. 90 Stat. 2903 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 3343(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1978).
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ing, treating, liquefying, transporting, or compressing the gas into the pipeline system.
The passthrough of the first sale acquisition costs of imported natural
gas is also subject to unique treatment. 19 1 With respect to liquefied natural
gas, subsection 203(a)(4) 9 2 requires that any portion of the first sale acquisition cost of new LNG imports exceeding the incremental pricing threshold ($1.48 per MMBtu as of March, 1978, plus inflation adjustment) be
incrementally priced. For natural gas imports other than LNG, subsection
203(a)(5) of the NGPA1 93 provides that any portion of the first sale acquisition cost of new natural gas imports exceeding the maximum lawful price
computed under section 102194 for the month in which the gas enters the
U.S. also be incrementally priced. 195 However, in connection with granting any authorization to import gas under the Natural Gas Act, the Secretary of the Department of Energy or the FERC has the discretion to
require incremental pricing of LNG and non-LNG volumes in certain in96
stances. 1
191. Id. § 3343(a)(4), (5).
192. Id § 3343(a)(4). However, § 203(a)(4), is subject to § 207(a), id § 3347, which
exempts from incremental pricing LNG projects which (1) received a certificate under § 3 of
the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1976), on or before May 1, 1978; (2) had a certificate
application pending as of May 1, 1978; and (3) projects where the Secretary of Energy or the
FERC determines that the importer had made substantial financial commitments or entered
into a binding contract on or before May 1, 1978. 15 U.S.C. § 3347 (Supp 11 1978). Section
207(c) is in turn subject to the provisions of § 207(c)(1), id § 3347(c)(1). See note 196 infra.
193. Id § 3343(a)(5).
194. Id § 3312. For January, 1980, the maximum lawful price computed under § 102
was $2.358 per million British thermal units (MMbtu). 45 Fed. Reg. 7782 (1980).
195. However, § 207(b), 15 U.S.C. § 3347(b) (Supp. 11 1978), mandates that the passthrough provisions of § 203(a)(5) shall only apply to volumes of non-LNG imports which
exceed both:
(1) the maximum delivery obligations, for the month in which such delivery of
such natural gas occurs, which is specified in contracts entered into on or before
May 1, 1978, and in effect when such delivery occurs; and
(2) the volume of natural gas imported into the United States by the interstate
pipeline involved during any corresponding period (determined appropriate by the
Commission) of calendar year 1977.
Section 207(b) is in turn subject to § 207(c), id § 3347(c). See note 196 infra. Of note with
respect to non-LNG imports is the FERC's recent authorization to import natural gas from
Mexico issued in Border Gas, Inc., Doc. No. CP80-93 (Dec. 21, 1979). The FERC required
the purchasing interstate pipeline companies to price incrementally the imported volumes
pursuant to § 203(a)(5) of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3343(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
196. As indicated in notes 191 and 194, the passthrough requirements of the first sale
acquisition cost of LNG and non-LNG import volumes specified in § 207(a) and (b), 15
U.S.C. § 347(a), (b) (Supp. 11 1978), are subject to § 207(c), 15 U.S.C. § 3347(c) (Supp. II
1978) which provides:
(c) Authority with respect to incremental pricing of natural gas or LNG imports.(1) LNG imports.- Subsection (a)(2) and (3) of this section shall not apply with
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In sum, Title II is a labyrinth of inclusions, exemptions, pricing categorespect to any liquefied natural gas imports if, in connection with the granting of
any authority under the Natural Gas Act to import such liquefied natural gas, the
Secretary of the Department of Energy or the Commission. . . determines that the
provisions of section 3343(a)(4) of this title shall apply with respect to such liquefied natural gas imports.
(2) Natural gas imports (other than LNG).The provisions of section
3343(a)(5) of this title shall apply to the passthrough of the first sale acquisition
costs of volumes of natural gas (other than liquefied natural gas) imported into the
United States which exceed the volume of natural gas imported into the United
States by the interstate pipeline involved during any corresponding period (determined appropriate by the Commission) of calendar year 1977 if, in connection with
the granting of any authority under the Natural Gas Act to import such natural
gas, the Secretary of the Department of Energy or the Commission. . . determines
that the provisions of section 3343(a)(5) of this title shall apply with respect to such
natural gas imports.
15 U.S.C. § 3347(c).
Section 502(d) of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3412(d) (Supp. 11 1978), provides that any determination made under § 207(c) that incremental pricing will apply to certain imports, shall be
made "in accordance with the procedures applicable to the granting of any authority under
the Natural Gas Act," thus referring to § 3 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1976). Section 3
of the NGA provides that the FERC, and now the Economic Regulatory Administration
(ERA), pursuant to Delegation Order Nos. 0204-54 and 0204-55 of the Secretary of Energy,
44 Fed. Reg. 56,735-36 (1979), may by order grant an import application: "with such modifications and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may find necessary or
appropriate, and may from time to time, after opportunity for hearing, and for good cause
shown, make such supplemental order in the premises as it may find necessary or appropriate." In this respect, § 3 of the NGPA has been interpreted to allow the FERC to revise
existing authorizations and impose additional conditions on import authorizations previously issued. See Distrigas Corp. v. FPC, 495 F.2d 2057 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Consequently, if
an import authorization has been issued and further authorization is not sought, the FERC
or the ERA may decide that a supplemental order requiring incremental pricing is "necessary or appropriate," in exercising the discretion granted in § 207 (c), 15 U.S.C. § 3347(c)
(Supp. 11 1978).
Of note with respect to § 207(c) of the NGPA is the following colloquy between Senators
Dominici and Jackson concerning the impact of this provision on LNG imports:
MR. DOMENICI. Section 207(c) recognizes the existing authority of the Department of Energy or the Commission under the Natural Gas Act to determine
whether to incrementally price the LNG imports of these projects at the time that
authority is granted.
It is my understanding that this provision is neutral as to whether incremental
pricing is appropriate and in no way is a mandate to the Department of Energy or
the Commission to impose incremental pricing.
MR. JACKSON. The Senator's understanding of the provision is correct.
MR. DOMENICI. One last question: In the event a determination is made
under the Natural Gas Act to incrementally price the LNG imports of the pending
projects, it is my understanding that the amount to be incrementally priced must be
in accordance with section 203(a)(4) and that the incremental pricing has to be
implemented under the legislation.
MR. JACKSON. The Senator's understanding is correct.
124 CONG. REC. S 16236 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Senators Domenici and Jackson).
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ries, surcharges, rulemakings,' 97 and congressional vetoes. The legislative
197. On September 28, 1979, the FERC issued Order No. 49 setting forth final rules
implementing a portion of Phase I of incremental pricing. 44 Fed. Reg. 57,726-54 (1979). In
brief, Order No. 49 established the regulatory framework for the calculation and billing of
incremental pricing surcharges to non-exempt boiler fuel facilities. The FERC also adopted
an incremental pricing passthrough mechanism based on a "reduced" purchased gas adjustment (PGA) charge to all nonexempt industrial boiler fuel users based on (1)actual gas
usage; (2) the applicable alternative fuel cost ceiling; and (3) the customer's monthly maximum surcharge absorption capability (MSAC).
The MSAC is the key element of the surcharge passthrough mechanism. In simplest
terms, it is the total difference between the cost of gas to a facility and the incremental
pricing ceiling applicable to the facility; that is, the total incremental costs the facility can
absorb before its price of gas rises above the applicable ceiling. The reduced PGA then
forms the basis of the PGA rate for all customers on a pipeline's system, with non-exempt
industrial customers billed on the basis of this reduced PGA rate, plus an incremental pricing surcharge. Order No. 49 required that natural gas suppliers commence booking incremental gas costs on January 1, 1980, and that billing for surcharges for nonexempt users
begin during January 1980.
On September 28, 1979, the FERC also issued, as part of phase I, Order No. 50. 44 Fed.
Reg. 57,754-77 (1979). This order established a three-tier system of alternative fuel cost
ceilings for computing the capacity of nonexempt industrial boiler fuel users to absorb gas
acquisition costs subject to incremental pricing. Under the three-tier rule, alternative fuel
cost ceilings will be published monthly for No. 2 fuel oil, high sulfur No. 6 fuel oil and low
sulfur No. 6 fuel oil in 31 large metropolitan areas and each of the lower 48 states. The
ceiling applicable to a particular user will be determined by the fuel which that user has the
installed capacity and legal authorization to burn. In the event an industrial facility cannot
use an alternative fuel, the highest fuel cost ceiling will apply. The three-tier system is
designed to maximize the passthrough of incrementally priced gas acquisition costs while
minimizing the possibility of load shifts. However, as a result of uncertainity concerning the
impact and administrative complexity of the three-tier system, the FERC concurrently issued Order No. 51, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,778-89 (1979), which proposed to exempt industrial
boiler fuel users from the higher No. 2 and low sulfur No. 6 alternative fuel ceiling prices
until November 1, 1980. Order No. 51 was transmitted for congressional review pursuant to
§ 206(d), 15 U.S.C. § 3346 (Supp. 11 1978). The review period expired on November 10,
1979, and Order No. 51 became effective since a resolution of disapproval was not passed by
either House of'Congress.
On May 6, 1980, the FERC submitted its Phase II rule to Congress, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,62280 (1980), as required by § 202 of the NGPA. 15 U.S.C. § 3342 (Supp. 11 1978). The Phase
II rule would extend incremental pricing to all industrial users of natural gas except those
specifically exempted under § 206, id § 3346. Section 202(c) provides that the Phase II rule
is subject to veto by either House of Congress within 30 days of continuous session. 15
U.S.C. § 3342(c). On May 20, 1980, the house voted 369-34 in favor of a resolution (H. Res.
655) to disapprove the FERC's Phase II rule, thereby restricting incremental pricing to industrial boiler fuel users. 126 CONG. REC. H3855 (May 20, 1980).
The Commission has proposed or promulgated numerous other rulemakings with respect
to incremental pricing, including proposed rulemakings which would provide for: (1) statewide rulemaking exemptions from incremental pricing, Doc. No. RM78-47, 45 Fed. Reg.
1081-84 (1980); (2) extending the category of exempt agricultural users, Doe. No. RM80-28,
45 Fed. Reg. 15,563-66 (1980); (3) permanent exemption of small boiler fuel facilities (under
300 Mcf/day) that have or will come into existence after November 9, 1978, Doc. No.
RM79-48, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,783-88 (1979); and (4) permanent exemption of exempt small
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objective of sheltering certain consumers from higher natural gas prices
may be laudatory but the means employed by Title II to accomplish this
goal are complex in theory and confusing in application.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF INCREMENTAL PRICING

It is the highest impertinence and presumption. . . in kings and
ministers, to pretend to watch over the economy of private people
... . If their own extravagance
does not ruin the state, that of
98
their subjects never will.1
There is presently no empirical evidence, tested by adjudication, demonstrating either the folly or the merit of Title II incremental pricing.19 9 One
congressman recently stated that incremental pricing will have a "beneficial effect ''2°" because it: is "an essential substitute for wellhead price controls as a wellhead market ordering device;"' ' "protects residential gas
users from initial wellhead price increases;" 2 2 and "will not drive industry
off natural gas.", 20 3 In contrast, the debate preceding the passage of the
NGPA reveals that several legislators believed that incremental pricing
was inequitable because it would apply only to the passthrough of certain
gas acquisition costs to industrial facilities that are "served by an interstate
pipeline," 2 ' and those "served by a local distribution company that is
boiler fuel users in existence as of November 9, 1978, as required by § 206(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
3346(a)(2).
198. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 329 (1937).

199. See4 New Wharton Study May Prove That DroppingTitle 11 Would Benefit Residentials in INSIDE F.E.R.C., Dec. 24, 1979, at 11, which commented:
Rep. Richardson Preyer argued that incremental pricing will "actually result in
higher costs for all consumers," even though incremental pricing "is intended to
protect residential gas users from inflated energy prices." Preyer disclosed that
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates is conducting an analysis that will
compare the inflationary impact of straight rolled-in pricing with the program outlined in Title II. "Based upon both common sense and the economic analysis conducted to date, I can speculate that the results will not be supportive of incremental
pricing," Preyer said in his statement. The Wharton study is a follow-up to a study
commissioned by the American Gas Ass'n to gauge the impact of a broad second
phase of incremental pricing compared with the first phase effort now being put
into place. Preyer cited the results of that study, which concludes that a worst case
second phase would drop the Gross National Product by an aggregate $22 billion
by 1989 (1979 Dollars) as well as increase unemployment by 600,000 workers, compared with phase I. FERC proposed last month the kind of broadly based incremental pricing program that was the subject of the Wharton study.
200. 126 CONG. REC. E59 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
201. Id at E60.
202. Id
203. Id
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 3341(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
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served by an interstate pipeline." ' 5 As a consequence, competitive disadvantages and economic favoritism could result."° Senator Hollins commented:
The bill is bad because it will hurt industry and cost jobs in the
consuming States since the bill imposes incremental pricing on
industry in consuming States but not on industry in producing
States. An industry's gas costs will be lower in the producing
States. Industry and the jobs it provides will be drawn from the
consuming to the producing States.20 7
Representative Couglin was more explicit:
The cockeyed direction of this legislation is evidenced even more
in the incremental pricing provisions which could, figuratively
and literally, produce disaster in consuming States such as Pennsylvania. Industrial users in producing States could buy natural
gas at lower prices than industrial users in other States. This is
the opposite of today's pricing mechanism. To attempt to cure
this by the provisions drafted in this bill may help kill off more
industry in the beleaguered Northeastern States. It is encouraging industries to relocate to producing States to take advantage of
lower gas prices. As a Congressman from Pennsylvania, -I find
this to be particularly bad practice. I can understand the need for
equity, but I cannot understand this blatant discrimination. 0 8
In addition to the foregoing problems, it can be assumed that the Congress
was also aware of the potentially adverse economic impact of Title II incremental pricing. 0 9
205. The term "interstate pipeline" for incremental pricing purposes refers to pipelines
that are subject to the FERC's jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. Moreover, for purposes of incremental pricing, "Hinshaw" pipelines, which are exempt from FERC jurisdiction under § l(c) of the Natural Gas Act, will be treated as local distribution companies, to
the extent they are served by an interstate pipeline. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
77, at 96.
206. See 124 CONG. REC. H13129 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Stockman).
207. Id at S16233 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hollings). Representative
Edwards from Oklahoma, a major natural gas producing state, expressed a similar concern:
Incremental pricing applies only to the interstate gas system, and therefore will
result in great inequities among regions and among customers, because pipelines
that have large numbers of residential customers [or] small numbers of industrial
customers will have to pass these higher costs directly on to residential customers.
Id at H13125 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). Representative Anderson stated in debate on the
same day that "several interstate pipelines are making plans already to deal with the movement of industry from their service industries [sic] because of incremental pricing" and that
a distribution company in his district "foresees large employers shifting production or new
expansion to gas-producing States where incremental pricing is not required by the legislation." Id at H13125-13126 (remarks of Rep., Anderson).
208. 124 CONG. REC. H13147 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Couglin).
209. An economic analysis accompanying the NGPA prepared by a House subcommit-
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Notwithstanding the present absence of judicial review, Title II incremental pricing can be subjected to analysis. Essentially, it is our assessment that the rate design mandated by Title II of the NGPA is unsound
economic policy, contrary to important national and social objectives, and
will not accomplish the intended objectives.
This article has observed that Title II incremental pricing is simply a
rate design methodology which shifts a "cost" to one category of a pipeline's consumers (industrials) in order to subsidize another category of
consumers (residentials). Such a rate design methodology is not inherently
wrong or undesirable. To the contrary, it is in theory politically attractive.
However, Title II incremental pricing loses whatever virtue it may possess
because it does not shift a true cost of the pipeline. Instead, Title II allocates a "cost" to industrial consumers based upon another commodity, the
ever increasing cost of OPEC priced fuel oil. Thus, the subsidy to the residential market bears little relation to the true cost of natural gas consumed
by those individuals.
Our criticism of Title II incremental pricing is not that of a purist who
believes that public utility rates must only be cost-based but that of one
who is aware of the skyrocketing price of oil. u l° As a consequence, the
subsidy to be paid by the industrial market is potentially enormous. Since
the industrial market will pay substantially more for its energy inputs,
there will be increases in the cost of virtually all goods produced in this
country. Such increases will be translated into higher consumer prices and
further inflation."1 ' They may also result in competitive disadvantages
among industrial users both here and abroad. 2
In addition to its direct adverse economic impact on the industrial market, higher consumer prices, and inflation, Title II incremental pricing will:
result in discrimination; produce an undesirable "camouflaging effect";
and be contrary to our goal of conserving energy. These three impacts can
be predicted because, first, Title II incremental pricing only shields or subsidizes residential users of natural gas. A home or apartment using fuel oil
tee concluded that the projected cost under Phase II incremental pricing to nonexempt industrial users in 1985 would be $4.00 per MMBtu. If only the Phase I rule were applicable,
the analysis projected that the cost to nonexempt industrial users would be $5.60 per
MMBtu in 1985. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 90, at 18.
210. See note 14 supra.
211. See note 11 supra.
212. Since Title II incremental pricing does not apply to sales of natural gas from intrastate sources, a manufacturer buying from such a source may have an economic advantage
over a competitor who buys from an interstate source that is subject to Title II incremental
pricing.
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receives no subsidy. 21 3 Second, Title II incremental pricing camouflages
costs to the consumer. Although his natural gas bill may be slightly lower,
the cost of all goods that he purchased will be higher because the increased
energy cost to the industrial sector will be passed through and multiplied
through the production and distribution chain. Finally, Title II incremental pricing will also provide a disincentive for conservation by the residential market. Since for certain consumers, the cost of natural gas will not be
increasing (or may even remain stable) as compared with the cost of all
other goods or even their neighbor's fuel oil costs, there is little incentive to
conserve the natural gas.
The foregoing criticism of Title II incremental pricing is only partially
complete because it is predicated on the assumption that the industrial
market is locked into using only natural gas and will not leave the pipeline
systems. This assumption, in our view, is not fully valid. It can reasonably
be anticipated that industrial users will abandon interstate pipeline systems and either switch to alternative fuels (the price of which, unlike natural gas, is negotiable) or relocate their plants to take advantage of
intrastate gas sources. If this occurs, the fixed and increasing purchased
gas costs of the interstate pipeline companies will have to be borne by their
remaining customers: the residential market. Thus, the consumers sought
to be protected by Title II incremental pricing will be forced to pay higher
prices for natural gas. This clearly will frustrate one of the primary objectives of Title II of the NGPA.
In sum, Congress will have erred if it does not take steps to defer or
repeal Title II incremental pricing. 214 Such a rate design methodology
may have been reasonable when the price of oil was approximately onethird of its current price.21 5 However, in today's energy market, Congress
should require all the costs of all forms of energy to be based upon market
conditions. To do otherwise would be contrary to national production and
salutary social objectives.
V.

CONCLUSION

The 1970's were particularly unkind to American consumers of
fuels and power, but those years were only a prologue: the 1980's
213. Since § 206(c)(2) of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3346(c)(2) (Supp. I 1978), does not
apply to "the generation of electricity by any electric utility," residential users of electricity
also are subsidized.
214. Under subsection 202(c)(1) & (2) of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. 3342(c)(1) & (2) (Supp. II
1978), Congress has the opportunity to review and disapprove FERC action dealing with
Phase II incremental pricing.
215. See note 14, supra.
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will be by far harsher. Indeed, the crossover into a world of permanent petroleum shortages, once predicted to occur in the midto late-1980's, is now at hand, foreshadowing oil-driven economic
crises, social unrest and the growing possibility of military action
- the time-honored remedy of nations whose peacetime policies
have failed.216
It is readily apparent that the energy future for the United States is grim.
One expert has predicted that by the year 2000 we must increase our energy sources by forty percent just to maintain our present standard of living.217
Against this prospect of significant imbalances in the consumption and
production of non-renewable fossil fuels, Phase II incremental pricing will
produce undesirable results that will undermine principles of public utility
ratemaking, and exacerbate our natural gas and petroleum fuels crisis.
The solution is legislative. It is urged, therefore, that Congress review Title II of the NGPA and determine that the factual predicates of stable and
relatively low oil prices, 21 8 which existed when the NGPA became law, no
longer exist. Instead, we are and will continue to be confronted with oil
supply disruptions and continuing price increases. Thus, Title II of the
NGPA is bad law since it forces undesirable patterns of energy consumption.
Mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes' observation that "[gleneral propositions
do not decide concrete cases,",2 19 Congress should eschew the legislation of
rate design methodologies to accomplish political objectives. Moreover,
Congress should not mandate that the FERC adopt a "hard and fast
rule"22 when its experience is based upon insufficient knowledge of the
regulatory impact.2 2z Instead, Congress should reevaluate Title II incremental pricing, and should repeal this provision of the NGPA in view of
current and projected impacts and realities.
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